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Civil Rights and the Cold War
A Rhetorical History of the Truman
Administration's Desegregation of the
United States Army
Steven R. Goldzwig

Rhetoric is associated popularly with demagoguery, bombast, empty
words, " mere rhetoric." In its various emanations from the mouths
of politicians, rhetoric is even more suspect-prima facie evidence
for immediate and rancorous distrust and disdain. For people disposed to such popular interpretations of rhetoriC, it is deeds, not
words, that matter; and such folk often suggest that this is especially the case in politics. I will take issue with this point of view
by arguing that rhetoric is action in the world, a very profound action that forms the basis of all human decision making and enactment. Rhetoric has ideological, social, and material implications.
On the strength of persuasive words, people go to war, make peace,
strengthen or weaken economies, pass programs or pass them up, act
graciously or brutishly. To get anything accomplished, one must be
persuaded that it is worth doing, worth the risk. Indeed, peaceful social change requires rhetorical struggle. Any prescription for individual or collective change must be argued for. And in argument there
is agon, struggle.
An investigation of rhetorical history is especially suited to trace
this peculiarly human contest because it allows us a special kind of
knowledge about politics and political actors. By using the unique
lens of history-through-speech (and speech-as-history), I hope to
demonstrate the proposition that history, politics, and the contemporary presidency are usefully served by documenting and analyzing
rhetorical practices. Because rhetorical history "takes rhetoric as its
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subject matter and perspective," it concerns itself with the role of
persuasion in the history of ideas, politics, and society. I Rherorical
history, then, is a special lens for describing and assessing political
actors, events, and cultures.
The rationale for doing rhetorical history is itself persuasive. First,
rhetorical histories allow us a closer look at political actors as word·
smiths in action. The close textual analysis of letters, memoranda,
logs, and other forms of recorded documentary evidence often can
supply scholars with the best evidence of the individual motives,
methods, beliefs, and values of political actors as they wrestle to
shape public philosophy and implement public policy. The persuasive
appeals launched by and directed at preSidents, cabinet members,
officers, advisors, friends, enemies, interest groups, and various other
public and private constituencies provide an important nexus for
the exploration of rhetorical history. It makes a difference who gives
the advice, who takes the advice, who ignores it, and why. Second,
rhetorical history is a lens for understanding political cultures. Rhe·
torical histories assess the sociopolitical and cultural legacy of par·
ticular administrations and help explain their impact on communal
memory. In studying the rhetorical dimensions of past proposals and
poliCies, we chart a common future. In sum, when they are well exe·
cuted, narrative accounts of contemporary presidencies and administrations based on rhetorical history are sites for the production of
further knowledge about the creations, motives, and policies of individual presidents and presidencies, the intricacies of the institutionaladministrative arrangements involved, and the cultural Significance
of such legacies. In short, rhetorical histories mount their own unique
narratives that leave us the richer for the telling.
I will demonstrate rhetorical history'S utility through a case study
of the Truman administration's historic efforts to desegregate the
United States Armed Services. My particular focus will be on the
Army, where the opposition to an integrated service was most entrenched and therefore the rhetorical struggle most telling.

Harry S. Truman and Civil Rights: Values and Public
Philosophy as Discursive Performance
Harry S. 1l"uman's views on civil rights are most accessible in his
public address. His words help reveal his character, values, and public
philosophy. The discourse also serves as a fair barometer of his expressed civil rights beliefs and therefore helps frame his public ac-
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countability. As William C. Berman notes, "Truman never hesitated
to pronounce his steadfast loyalty to the ideas of justice and equality.'" Moreover, "In practically every speech President Truman made
on civil rights, he pointed out the necessity for Americans to practice
what they preached, since the world was watching.'" Indeed, the issue of civil rights was important not only in its own right but also
because of its perceived consequences in international affairs. As
Richard Dal6ume contends, "Cold War propaganda against the
United States hit hard at the race problem; State Department expertS
estimated that nearly half of the Russian propaganda against the
United States was focused on this issue alone.'" With Truman's assistance Jim Crow was transmogrifying into a formidable diplomatic
dilemma.
Truman's civil rights philosophy can be adduced in various public speeches and commentaries. During the 1940 election year, for
example, Truman stated: "In giving to the Negroes the rights that are
theirs, we are only acting in accord with ideas of a true democracy. ,,'
Berman judged such discourse "a model of sobriety and good taste,"
especially "when measured against typical southern utterances on
civil rights" at the time."
The Truman presidency was witness to events, however, that
seemed to erode both the law and social relations. The president became increasingly convinced of the need for a major civil rights initiative_ On June 26, 1946, President Truman sent a message to the
NAACP's annual convention . He assured participants that the ballot
was a sacred right and that any form of organized terrorism against
the franchise was nothing less than intolerable in a free democratic
society. Yet the South would not become, by any stretch of the imagination, a willing partner in equal Citizenship for African Americans.
Indeed, vigilante violence and murder perpetrated by white southern
nightriders seemed a chilling reminder of the vengeance of those who
opposed the gathering forces of social change. '
After the crushing off-year election defeat of Democrats in the
1946 Congress, Truman issued Executive Order 9008, which created
a presidential civil rights committee. As Berman indicates, Truman
"undoubtedly wanted to see 'fair treatment' extended to all citizens.
It is not likely, however, that he wished to upset his working relationships with the South in "December, 1946, in order to support such an
objective. Yet by establishing a civil rights committee, Truman inadvertently built up political pressure that could spell trouble for him
in the future. lIS
In his State of the Union Address on January 6, 1947, Truman announced that present civil rights abuses would require federal legis-
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lation: "We have recently witnessed in this country 'numerous attacks upon the constitutional rights of individual citizens as a result
of racial and religious bigotry, . .. I have, therefore, by Executive order established the President's Committee on Civil Rights, with a
view to making recommendations to the Congress.'" Not coincidentally, in this same address Truman declared that despite having de·
mobilized the armed services in 1946, the nation still would "need
well-equipped, well-trained armed forces and we must be able to mo·
bilize rapidly our resources in men and material for our own defense
should the need arise." Significantly, the president noted, "We are
encountering serious difficulties in maintaining our forces even at
these reduced levels." Truman's military advisors were warning him
that he might have to reinstitute the draft. The Selective Service law
in force at the time was scheduled to expire on March 3 1.iO
On January 15, 1947, the president commissioned his civil rights
committee; on January 16 he announced that the three services had
reached an agreement on the plan to unify the armed forces. At first
glance these two activities would seem to be unrelated. However, on
March 12, 1947, Truman deliver.ed his "Special Message to Congress
on Greece and Thrkey: The Truman Doctrine." Therein Truman declared the United States ready, willing, and able to take up its role
as the defender of the free world. As a result the state of military
preparedness would become one of the key foreign policy issues
of the Truman administration. Because civil rights abuses now constituted an obstacle to an efficient and effective fighting force, they
now took on added urgency.
The convergence of civil rights, the emergent cold war, and U.S.
armed forces preparedness is perhaps best elaborated in Truman's
historic June 29, 1947, address to the NAACP. In this landmark
speech the president would stake out an unprecedented role for the
federal government in the civil rights arena. Truman spoke of a "turning point in the long history of our country's efforts to guarantee
freedom and equality to all our citizens." Truman stated, "the extension of civil rights today means, not protection of the people against
the Government, but protection of the people by the Government."
The president clarified the mission: "Our immediate task is to remove the last remnants of the barriers which stand between millions of our citizens and their birthright. There is no justifiable reason for discrimination because of ancestry, or religion, or race, or
color." Truman declared emphatically, "Our National Government
must show the way! "" Truman underlined the foreign policy implications of vigilance toward civil rights at home: "Our case for democracy should be as strong as we can make it. It should rest on practical
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evidence that we have been able to put our own house in order... .
We can no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack upon prejudice and discrimination." " Given Truman's prior public statements
and the president'S own predilections in foreign affairs, it seemed
natural to cast civil rights in this light. As the president saw it the
United States's first obligation was to "put our own house io order."
Only then could Americans credibly promote Western-style democracy and confidently solicit the allegiance of the world community
to democratic principles and practices. The link between practicing
civil rights at home and fostering democratic principles abroad would
have profound implications for generations of Americans in their
thoughts on war, peace, and race relations in the United States.
On February 2, 1948, basing his policy on the recommendations
of his October 1947 civil rights committee report, To Secure These
Rights, the president delivered yet another unprecedented civil rights
address. Striking a calm, dignified, humane tone, Truman asked Congress for additional authority to act on pressing issues, which included establishing a permanent Commission on Civil Rights,
strengthening existing civil rights laws by securing federal protection against lynching, insuring voting rights protections, impaneling
the long-delayed Fair Employment Practices Commission, and enacting measures prohibiting discrimination in interstate transportation. 13 The president also indicated his resolve to fortify federal nondiscrimination policy. Regarding U.S . armed forces, in particular, the
president remarked pointedly: "During the recent war and in the
years since its close we have made much progress toward equality of
opportunity in our armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin. I have instructed the Secretary of Defense to
take steps to have the remaining instances of discrimination in the
armed services eliminated as rapidly as possible. The personnel policies and practices of all the services in this regard will be made consistent." I. Recognizing its propaganda potential, the government carried the president's address over Voice of America. Berman observed
that "the civil rights message now entered the cold war arena as a
document of diplomacy. At home it immediately became a source of
major political controversy.,,15
Although the president'S civil rights legislation would founder on
the shoals of powerful; at times virulent, southern opposition in Congress, the military reform he contemplated was a matter of executive responsibiliry; presidential action required no congressional approval. Truman's authority to issue an executive order would enable
him to make his most indelible mark on civil rights policy by targeting continuing forms of discrimination in the military.
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The Fahy Committee:
A History of Institutional Warfare
On July 26, 1948, a day prior to convening a special session of Congress to attend to ongoing national problems of inflation and housing, Truman issued Executive Orders 9980 and 9981. As Berman
notes, both orders were directly tied to the upcoming campaign
and election: "The Truman orders were timed perfectly . .. to focus
attention on Congress. And, concurrently, to undercut [Progressive
Party candidate Henry] Wallace's standing with many Negroes. "i6
Executive Order 9980 authorized a federal review board for investigating discrimination in federal government employment practices.
The Fair Employment Board was set up as an arm of the Civil Service
Commission. It sought to review cases, supervise compliance, and
adjudicate appeals. It had no direct enforcement powers-save imploring the president to take additional action whenever and wherever he deemed necessary. " Executive Order 9981 directed new efforts at equal opportunity in the armed forces and created the
President's Committee on Equaliw of Treatment and Opportunity in
the Armed Services, which was authorized to begin oversight tasks.
Significantly, the order made no mention of segregation. It was impossible to tell whether the order was intended to achieve an integrated armed services. The executive orders predictably raised the ire
of southern Democrats for going too far and the suspicions of the
black community for not going far enough.18 After issuing the two
orders Truman appeared in person before Congress the next day to
outline his eight-point legislative package, which also included civil
rights provisions. The response was "noticeably cool. " I.
At the time Harry S. Truman signed Executive Order 9981 , "the
racial scene in the services was scandalous, if viewed from any perspective of fairness ."w The order read in part: "There shall be equality of treatment for all persons in the armed services without regard
to race, color, religion, or national origin. This policy shall be put
into effect as rapidly as possible, haVing due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale. " Truman directed his committee " to examine the
rules, procedures, and practices of the armed services in order to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be
altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this
order." The committee was charged with executing its duties "until
such time as the President shall terminate its existence by Executive
order. ,,21 As Dalfiume notes, "BaSically, the President's committee
was a liberal one. " ll
What came to be known as the Fahy Committee would work with
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the various branches of the armed services in planning and implementing a fair and equitable process for eliminating the entrenched
apartheid of the status quo. The Navy and Air Force were already
making substantial progress toward integration, so the main stumbling block resided with the Army. Whether or not it was admitted,
or even foreseen, the president's order would become the opening
salvo in a great social experiment. The daunting task before the committee was simple in its complexity: to see if people serving in a
democracy could get along with each other and to erase the longstanding color line in the nation's military. As directed by President
Truman, this experiment in human relations was now a federal mission and responsibility.
EARLY STIRRINGS OF ARMY OP POSITION. One month before the formal
appointment of the Fahy Committee membership, the Army was preparing to release its own report, "The Negro in the Army." In late
August of 1948 the Army pressed to have this report released immediately in an effort to upstage a report with recommendations to be
issued by black leaders, such as Lester Granger of the Urban League,
who had met with Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal in late
April to discuss means of redressing ongoing racial problems in the
military." Presidential advisor Philleo Nash informed Clark Clifford
that the Army's report was "carelessly executed" and contained "several deficiencies" and "old statistics." Even more damning from
Nash's perspective, the Army's report made no mention of the president's newly announced committee. 24 Clifford, also fretting over the
Army report's contents, timing, and reception, issued a memo to Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall: "Since the Defense Establishment seems to feel strongly that this report should be made public in
advance of the recommendations of the Granger group, we will not
object .. . provided that it is accompanied by a statement that it covers the situation prior to the issuance of the recent Executive Order
on Equality and lfeatment of Opportunity in the Armed Services . ...
My personal recommendations would be that the Granger recommendations and this report be released simultaneously. ,,25
Although the Committee would not meet formally until January
of 1949, the effect of the president's order was immediate and profound. On the positive side of the ledger, Donald S. Dawson, an administrative assistant, would inform the president, "Since your Executive Order was issued, all important opposition to the draft on the
basis of the Army's race policy has disappeared ... . Negro leaders and
their white friends have been universal in their praise.""
Secretary of the Army Royall, however, was worried about the composition of the president's committee. He complained to Truman:
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"[A] number of [those] being considered ... have publicly expressed
their opinion in favor of abolishing segregation in the Armed Services . At least one of them, Lester Grainger [sic!, has been critical
both of the Army and of me personally on this particular matter. I
feel strongly that no person should serve on this Committee who h"s
formed a fixed opinion on this subject on either side.... I would like
an opportunity to discuss this matter with you personally before appointments are made. ,,27
On October 21, 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal notified
the military service secretaries of the Fahy Committee plans. At that
time the president's committee expected to meet for the first time
in mid-November and anticipated completing its work within two
months. Meanwhile, as chair, Judge Charles Fahy had requested background materials. Forrestal directed "each Department [to] designate
one of its Assistant Secretaries as the official point of contact for the
Department with Mr. Fahy's Committee." He also advised the assistant secretaries to work with "one ranking Negro officer" and with
the members of the Armed Services Personnel Board."
A NEW PLAN. On December 2, 1948, after a series of delays, Secretary
of the Army Kenneth C. Royall submitted to Defense Secretary Forrestal an experimental Army integration plan: "I propose, but only if
similar action is taken by the Navy and the Air Force, to establish
a completely non-segregated Army post with approximately 5,000
officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the following units:
(1) One infantry regimental combat team. (2) One engineer battalion.
(3) One station hospital and medical complement. (4) One post headquarters. Of the enlisted men, roughly 10% will be Negro, this being approximately the average proportion in the Army at present."
Royall thought it important to create "widespread understanding of
the project" while Simultaneously preventing "too much publicity or
non-representative publicity." He advised Forrestal to limit press visits. The experiment, which became known as the Royall Plan, was
meant to test the willingness of troops to serve in integrated units,
the efficiency and combat value of such an arrangement, the implications for the command structure, any ensuing social, morale, or discipline problems, opportunities for African American advancement,
and finally, whether the experiment could be generalized to the Army
as a whole. 2• Designed to demonstrate "progress" on the race issue
and to counteract the Fahy initiatives, the Royall plan was distributed
to the other branches of the service for review and comment.
Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington, in responding to
the Royall Plan, was less than enthusiastic. In a memorandum to Forrestal he observed: "The experiment will not be conclusive. There are
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so many artificial features involved that success or failure of this experiment would not be predictive of success or failure under other
conditions .... The public relations aspects ... are particularly undesirable. By its very nature, the attention and searching scrutiny of
the Negro press and various pressure groups would be focused upon
this activity which, through its artifiCiality, is of minimal military
significance but of major significance in the current public controversy on purely racial issues." Symington contended, on the other
hand, that the Air Force was in a position to conduct such an experiment because it already had trained black technicians in place to
meet the call for 10 percent representation and he anticipated no social or morale difficulties'o
Acting for the secretary of the Navy, John Nicholas Brown's response was similar to that of the Air Force. The Navy felt the experiment "will certainly create widespread publicity ... [that would be
in] large portion . .. adverse and non-constructive in nature. With regard to the Navy the assignment of Negro personnel is made without
reference to the race of the individual. [Indeed,] very satisfactory
progress has been made in the Navy and the Marine Corps without
creating problems of morale and discipline or lowering the esprit de
corps. 1I3l

Because both the Air Force and the Navy seemed to be moving forward on the president's executive order without much prodding, even
before the Fahy Committee formally convened, the Army seemed, by
contrast, all the more mired in the so-called "Negro problem." Much
of its trouble seemed to stern from inflexibility. The officers themselves seemed most intransigent. Whether Secretary of the Army
Royall knew his plan would be unacceptable to his sister services is
unknown. Royall may have insisted that the Air Force and the Navy
had to go along with his plan knowing that, given their different situations, there would be little agreement. In this way the "experiment"
would be scuttled."
The Rhetorical Battles of 1949

The symbolic import of Executive Order 9981 was widespread. Yet
the mere proclamation of equality in the armed forces did not make
it a reality. Six months had passed and it was still unclear whether
Truman had partial or total desegregation in mind. Nor was it entirely clear what impact the order might have on the armed services.
Another hard round of persuasion was about to begin as the Fahy
Committee began the arduous task of implementing Truman's order.
The president met with the Fahy Committee on January 12. A text
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drafted for Truman's use in addressing the committee is instructive
regarding the administration's philosophy:
OUI total national economy demands the most effective utilization of
every citizen. Likewise it is the privilege and responsibility of every citizen
to make the maximum possible contribution to OUf national strength . The

concept of democracy that our nation represents to the peoples of the world
demands that there be equality of treatment and opportunity in the armed
services as well as in o ther phases of our national life. The Committee will
wish to make a comprehensive survey of the past and present status and
service of the Negro citizen in the armed services . . .. It is my profound de-

sire that the work of this Committee shall yield results which will not be
simply a report, but a set of operable plans, a blueprint, for constructive action. The national security requires that you make your contribution, COD-

sistent with the fundamental ~hts of all men, toward the full development
of the strength of our country.
In highlighting the economic and national security aspects of the
committee's responsibilities, Truman rhetorically subordinated individual civil rights to the collectiv.e national welfare. Post-World War
II national pragmatics trumped the larger moral questions. These arguments also were uniquely tailored to counteract m ilitary opposition.
At the actual January 12 meeting, which lasted ten minutes, uuman told the committee: "I have asked you ... to serve on this commission in an effort to expedite the thing in the Government Service
so that you can actually carry out the spirit, as well as the letter of
the order [no. 9981] .... I'm satisfied that with this sort of setup we
can get the thing working as it should work. " In requesting a unified
and consistent policy, Truman seemed to have in mind something
beyond a simple concern with the armed services. His vision for civil
rights in America was expansive: " I want this rounded out a little bit.
I want the Department of the Interior, the Commerce Department,
the Treasury Department, interviewed on the subject [of] why you are
in existence, and let's make it a Government proposition, as well as
an Armed Services [one]." Indeed, uuman's expressed intention was
deCidedly not to merely " limit it to just one branch of the Government. That's what I have in mind all the way down the line. Not only
that, I think we've got to go further-not at this time, but later- and
see that the state and local governments carry out the spirit of the
laws which we hope to get on the books down here during this session of Congress." As envisioned by the president at the time, the
armed services would become a model for the nation.
The president appeared wary of the negative publicity that could
follow the committee's formal and informal investigative work: "I
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want it done in such a way that it is not a publicity stunt. I want
concrete results-that's what I'm after- not publicity on it. I want
the job done and I want to get it done in a way so everybody will be
happy to cooperate to get it done. Unless it is necessary to knock
somebody's ears down, I don't want to have to do that, but, if it becomes necessary, it can be done. But that's about all I've got to tell
you."

numan's was a tall order given the history of the services and their
demonstrated lack of cooperation with each other in prior encounters over the desegregation issue. Still, the tone had been set. A nononsense approach would be adopted by the Fahy Committee. The
president "hoped" the committee could get back to him with a report
by June 1, "and then," he said, " if it is necessary to continue, why, we
can go on from there, in order to give you plenty of time. I'd like to
have the outline of the situation before the Congress adjourns in case
we need to ask for any legal amendments to the law because, in that
hearing, at that time, we will endeavor to pass the Civil Rights Program as outlined in my message on the subject in the last Congress.
I hope to get some concrete results of that in the Eighty-first Congress, 1134
On January 18 E. W. Kenworthy, executive secretary of the Fahy
Committee, voiced confidence in the ongoing informal developments since the issuance of the president's executive order: "I think
the President's Committee has done pretty well on this. The Army
has now accepted three of our four recommendations----on opening
schools and jobs, and on assignment to any unit-and there remains
now only the fourth recommendation, the elimination of the 10 per
cent quota. I am sure we will get that too.,, 35 Kenworthy had engaged
in a bit of wishful thinking; a much longer struggle lay ahead. This
was brought home most forcefully to the Fahy Committee at its
March 28 meeting.
On March 28, 1949,
Judge Fahy's committee was anxious to talk with the service secretaries on a number of items, including 11) whether the earlier Gillem
Report IWD Circular 124) "envisageldl the eventual elimination of
segregation"; 12) the secretaries' interpretation of Executive Order
9981; 13) whether there was a need for a "unified policy on utilization
of Negro manpower"; 14) whether the Fahy Committee should hear
testimony from the joint services' Personnel Policy Board; 15) the secretaries' ideas and suggestions regarding administration and implementation of new policy; and 16) specific questions for Secretary Royall on the "policy and practice" of Generals Clay and MacArthur. J6
At the meeting Secretary Royall, armed with a lengthy statement,
"EXCEPTIONALLY AND PEC ULIARLY QUALIFIED."
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reiterated Army arguments for continuing segregation. He rehearsed
the long-standing racist viewpoints common at the time:
The Army is not an instrument for social evolution . ... Applied to the
question of segregation, the criteria must be what produces the greatest and
most effective use of all our manpower . .. so that we may place a winning
Army on the battlefield .... The history of two wars has demonstrated that
in general Negro troops have been less qualified than white troops for the
pe.rformance of certain types of military service, for example, service with
the infantry or with other units requiring troops I/close with the enemy. II
On the other hand, there are undoubtedly other functions for which Negro
troops are exceptionally and peculiarly qualified. Motor or ship transport
service might be given as examples. It follows that in the interest of efficient
national defense certain types of units should be entirely or largely confined
to white troops, and that where Negroes are assigned to any of those units,
they should be carefully selected .

Royall also maintained that an integrated Army posed morale problems. He argued that troops engaged in war must "have confidence
both in their leaders and in the ql.e n that are to fight by their sides";
thus, "in close personal relationships such as exist in an Army unit,
voluntary segregation is normal in ordinary civilian relations. And
this is true even in those localities where no type of segregation is
required by law." Royall contended, "In this connection we must remember that a large part of the volunteers in the Army are southerners-usuallya larger proportion than from any other part of the country. Whether properly or not, it is a well known fact that close
personal association with Negroes is distasteful to a large percentage
of Southern whites." Therefore, "abandonment" or "sudden change
in .. . the Army's partial segregation policy would . .. adversely affect enlistments and reenlistments not only in the South but in many
other parts of the country, probably making peacetime selective service necessary." Royall thus raised the specter of racial resistance
weakening military preparedness.
According to Royall one of the "most difficult" problems was getting white soldiers "to serve under Negro officers or particularly under Negro non-commissioned officers." He argued that black enlistments did not suffer under the present policy and that the Army was
taking steps to improve opportunities for advancement. "As a matter
of fact," Royall boasted, " the progress of the Negro in the Army-and
his present status-is superior to that which he occupies in any other
department of the Government-military or otherwise. Nowhere
else does the Negro hold as many positions of importance and responsibility." This latter argument had been an old saw.
Despite his negative declamations, Royall said the Army was still
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willing to make "such adjustments as are necessary from time to
time to meet changing conditions." Royall concluded that the Army
had initiated" the best practical method of handling-and gradually
narrowing-the segregation problem." He thought it inappropriate
"to force a pace faster than is consistent with the efficiency and morale of the Army-or to follow a course inconsistent with the ability
of our Army, in the event of war, to take the battlefield with reasonable assurance of success."" Royall's testimony must have shaken all
but the most inveterate optimists on the Fahy Committee. Members
had thus far demonstrated themselves to be steely-eyed realists, however, so it was also highly unlikely that they would fold up their
tents. They were committed for the duration. And change was in the
wind.
That same day, March 28, Louis A. Johnson formally replaced an
ailing, overworked, and increasingly befuddled James Forrestal, who
had submitted his letter of resignation as Secretary of Defense on
March I, 1949.38 On April 6 Secretary Johnson issued a memorandum to all secretaries of the armed services and the chair of the personnel policy board announcing some "supplemental" policies pursuant to equal opportunity. Provision lb. 13) seemed to add a new
wrinkle: "Some units may continue to be manned with Negro personnel; however, all Negroes will not necessarily be assigned to Negro units. Qualified Negro personnel shall be assigned to fill any type
of position vacancy in organizations or overhead installations without regard to race. II

The new policy proved controversial. The pivotal word here was
organizations. Army policy had previously limited the employment
of blacks in desegregated units to "overhead" tasks, which included
menial duties such as housekeeping, laundry, commissary duty, and
the like. The word organizations could be interpreted as increasing
opportunities, and as written the new directive seemed at odds with
existing Army policy; however, the Fahy Committee only learned of
its existence from Johnson on April 18, when he declined an invitation to testify at the committee's April 26 meeting. Johnson argued
that his appearance would be " premature" and " unprofitable" because he had not had time to assimilate" the details of this difficult
problem." Johnson did promise to examine present poliCies, to solicit
statements from' the service secretaries, and to have them reviewed
by the personnel board "to determine their adequacy.,,3.
Johnson's new order proved vexing to the Fahy Committee, which
not only suffered such unilateral action but now risked being preempted. Johnson's directive inspired increased vigilance as the committee pondered counter moves and carefully calibrated the public
relations ramifications involved. johnson's order also induced a healthy
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skepticism toward continuing the present course of action, a skepticism further encouraged by the evolution of the negotiations with the
Army, the suspicion that the numbers submitted by the Army did not
convey the full extent of the ongoing problems, and the Fahy Committee's own investigations. As one thoughtful person in an unsigned
memorandum to Charles Fahy suggested, "I now think that we better
jump from battalion to man-to-man integration .. . . The new policy
is nothing but the old practice in small print .. . . Our visit to Meade
convinced me that while Negroes are indeed being put into overhead
installations, they are not being assigned in anything like the numbers they could be." The author seemed to have his hand on the true
pulse of the dilemma:
Secretary Johnson'S memo raises real problems for the Committee . ... Except for a flat statement eliminating aJJ segregated units, there is not much

by way of a policy statement that the Committee could make which would
go beyond the Secretary's. Therefore, the Committee must concentrate on
procedural matters in its recommendations. I do not know what procedures
the three services will propose in reply' to Johnson'S memo-I daresay noth-

ing very revolutionary. But I think it would be very bad if the Fahy Committee proposed concrete steps which seemed to fall short of the Johnson policy .
. . . Perhaps it isn't a policy.... But the press and the public think it is a policy, and they think it is a promise .... We have been put in a tough spot.
In anticipating an upcoming interim report for President Truman,
the writer advised Fahy to issue "recommendations on the Army
only. The reason ... is that our thinking is likely to be pretty conclusive on the Army. Therefore, if there are leaks-and there are
bound to be-at least the recommendations will stand examination.
I would want to know a lot more about the Navy and the Air Force
before I submitted any recommendations, even in an interim report."'" Nevertheless, under the committee's continuing pressure,
the "yeast ... [seemed] to be working." The Army was now "considering the abolition of quotas." Moreover, "if men ... [were[ assigned
on the basis of their MOS [Military Occupational SpeCialties!. regardless of race," then reason argued that segregation would "come tumbling of its own weight.,,41
INITIAL RE C OMMENDATIONS AND INTERIM REPORT. The initial recommendations drafted by the Fahy Committee ori May 24 detailed
the process of prying open the closed opportunities in the present
system. Perhaps most important, and most difficult of all, was the
committee's call for the abolition of racial quotas as promulgated by
WD Circular 124 (a.k.a. the Gillem Board Report) and the substitu-
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tion of intelligence test classifications la.k.a. General Classification
Tests, or GCTs). As the Fahy Committee noted, "The [presentJ quota
system does not implement, but goes far to defeat, the Army's declared policy in Circular 124. " The Army complained that the higher
enlistment scores required by the Navy and the Air Force resulted in
the Army's securing a higher percentage of men in the two lowest
test score categories IClass IV and Class V). One preferred solution
was simply to make "the entry intelligence score for the three services . .. the same." 42
Responding to Defense Secretary Johnson's call to reexamine service policies, Acting Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, who served
as Royall's successor, issued a vigorous defense of Army implementation of policies under the Gillem Board regulations. Gray was especially wary of changing the quota system based on test scores, arguing that this would reduce the number of recruits dramatically: "The
Army currently limits Negro enlistments to their civilian population ratio, about 10 percent.... There is a definite limit to the number of men with low GCT's that the Army can absorb ... . Without a
quota system of any kind, Negro membership could rise easily to 30
or 40 percent." Gray advised Johnson: "There is a growing concern
among many senior officers ... that we are weakening to a dangerous
degree the combat efficiency of our Army. These officers are familiar
with the combat performance of Negro troops during war and feel
that we have already gone too far in inserting colored organizations
in white combat units. ,,43

On June 7, in a follow-up report to the president, the Fahy Committee indicated it had made "considerable progress." Admitting that the
Army's second plan "did not go beyond the framework of its present
policy and practice," the committee assured the president that it
"[expectedJ to have further conferences" and asked for a delay in issuing their required interim report while they tried to negotiate
pending matters. Truman granted this request.«
Army intransigence was much more serious than the progress report indicated. As Kenworthy complained to Fahy, "The Army is determined to do nothing about guaranteeing that Negroes completing
school courses will be used regardless of race." Kenworthy lamented,
"I do not see how the Army can expect to keep its segregation policy
inviolate when the Navy and the Air Force have abandoned segregation as a policy. The beginning on integration which the Committee
has recommended, it seems to me, is modest, gradual, and calculated
to improve the Army's use of manpower. I cannot see how it could
cause the Army any embarrassment or lower its efficiency. ,,45
Kenworthy's frustration was based on both short-term and longterm concerns. Achieving cooperation on desegregating the services
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was in the interest of African Americans and in the national interest
of efficient use of personnel; however, this issue also had a direct
bearing on the reorganization of the postwar military establishment. 46 The monumental postwar restructuring of the American defense system was materially jeopardized by an unfathomable, unwieldy, and, for many, embarrassing resistance to change. At the
dawn of the cold war the Army's recalcitrance created an immobilizing effect. In rejecting a third Army plan, dated July 6, the Fahy
Committee informed the secretary of the Army that, among other
flaws,
the abolition of quotas to major commands for school selection is profligated
by the retention of quotas in assignment to units, and thereby intensifies
rather than eliminates unequal treatment and opportunities . ... The pro-

posed improvement of numerical utilization of Negroes in MOS of each field
is dissoluted by the restricted utilization of the individual to the opportunities offered on a fixed basis to persons only of his race . . . . It is this Committee's best judgment that the . , . proposal fails to meet in any reasonable manne r the spirit and letter of the President'S Order.

This intransigence was accompanied by an annoying tactical delay.
The Army had proposed appointing a board to look into ongoing matters and encouraged the committee not to make a report to the president until it convened and issued its own recommendations. From
Kenworthy'S perspective this request was a slap in the face: "Now
suddenly the Army suggests that the problem, which was being discussed at what amounts to a cabinet level, be turned over to a board
of Army officers for review. The plain intimation is that the Army
can handle this matter unilaterally, without further interference
from the President's Committee."" Given the meager prospects indicated by these stifling developments, it was anyone's guess how long
true conversion to a fully integrated Army might take. By July of
1949 Kenworthy and Fahy were taking no bets.
The Fahy Committee sent Truman its interim report on July 27.
The committee advised the president that the Army had met "some
parts of our recommendations" but had not yet met the full requirements of Executive Order 9981. The committee had proposed four
major revisions in the Army's present policy:
I) Open up all classes of Army jobs to qualified personnel without
regard to race;
.
2) open all courses in Army schools to qualified personnel without
regard to race;
3) assign and use personnel upon completion of school courses
without regard to race;
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4) abolish the racial quota, substituting a quota system based on
the distribution of mental grades as determined by the General Classification Test.
This four-point program, long the benchmark for Army compliance
with Executive Order 9981, continued as the basis for controversy.
The fourth demand remained least amenable to change.
The committee informed the president that the racial quota issue
had proven particularly vexing because the Army had previously
agreed to drop the quota only if all three services were to adopt
the same minimal standards of acceptance. Nevertheless, the interim
report remained adamant on this issue: "The Committee is of the
opinion that the Army should abolish the racial quota now.,,48
The Army's continued resistance may have given the committee pause for additional reflection. On August 8, 1949, Kenworthy assured Fahy that the committee's proposed policy was appropriate. After going over the files of the old McCloy Committee operations
during World War II, the Fahy Committee's executive secretary, perhaps self-servingly, said he had found "a history of unrelieved headaches." He lamented: "I cannot understand how the Army can defend
its racial policy by appealing to experience. 1 was never more certain
that we are on the right track. If our recommendations had been in
effect in the twenty years between the wars, 1 feel certain that the
Army would have had more efficient Negro troops. ,,'9The committee
still understood itself as making no more than sensibly moderate demands. Its Army directives were never meant to "break up immediately its segregated units." All proposals were merely directed at
"getting the best utilization out of more highly qualified Negroes in
the Army. "so This rherorical tack was repeated over and over.
On September 26 Judge Fahy informed the president that there seemed to be agreement on all issues except the
quota, and if actual implementation proceeded in accordance with
the committee's intentions, then "great progress" was within reach .
On September 30 Secretary of the Army Gray advised Secretary of
Defense Johnson that he had developed new regulations, subject to
the service secretary's concurrence, that would accede to the Fahy
Committee's demands. Military Occupational Specialties would
seemingly be opened to qualified personnel regardless of race; quotas
for attending Army schools would ostensibly be abolished; promotions would be handled on an "equal merit" system; ROTC students
would train and remain together without racial reference; and a new
board of senior Army officers would meet on a regular basis to review
progress on the new policies. This new policy initiative did not immediately break up existing segregation; rather, it seemed to assure
A NEW INITIATIVE.
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equal opportunity for qualified enlistees and personnel in existing
units. Johnson issued a press release announcing these changes. The
Fahy Committee, however, was unsure whether the new Army directive went "far enough" and implored the president not to comment
publicly until a full committee assessment could be undertaken.51
Trying to sort out the implications of the newest Army proposal
and the defense secretary's subsequent public endorsement proved,
like everything else associated with these efforts, to be a bit of a trial,
as minority affairs aide David K. Niles made clear in an October 5
memorandum to Truman: "Fahy['s] committee reached an agreement
with the army that assignment of qualified personnel to specialist
occupations would be on the basis of merit and fitness without regard to race or color. Yet the Army's program is evasive on this point,
which the Fahy Committee feels is key to their entire objective.. ..
[Moreover,] Secretary johnson's [press] release, covering this program, is arousing a good deal of controversy, and has resulted in inquiries from a number of reporters, and letters and telegrams from
interested organizations.""
A "Further Interim Report to th~ President" reinforced Niles's assessment. Issued on October 6 by Fahy on behalf of the committee,
this report was directly occasioned by johnson's announcement of
the new Army policy. Fahyobserved, "It is true that the new program
is a step forward, but its effectiveness is seriously impaired by the
omission to provide that, after the men have acquired their Military
Occupational Specialties and have completed their school courses,
they shall be assigned according to their qualifications and without
regard to race or color." Although all parties antiCipated a "slow process," Fahy argued, "that should not be a deterrent to the adoption of
the assignment policy we have urged." 53
The Further Interim Report addressed the problem of assignments
bluntly. The opening of the Military Occupational Specialties would
be nulliJled to a considerable degree by the failure of the program to provide
that personnel, to whom these opportunities will be accorded, wiU be assigned without regard to race or color. Unless ass ignments are so made, and
are not restricted as at present to Negro and overhead units, the principle of
equality of treatment and opponunity is not carried forward and the manpower of the Army is not utilized to best advantage. The Committee feels
that this further logical step is required to effectuate the President's Execu·
tive Order 9981 and the statement of the Secretary of Defense of April 6,
54
1949.

Meanwhile, abolition of the quota system was still a bone of contention. The intricacies of abolishing the racial quota are perhaps
160 / Steven R. Goldzwig

best exemplified in Kenworthy's memorandum of October 29. He
told the committee he was now in "an impossible situation" and
described a breakdown in the "firm understanding with Gray and
[Special Consultant to the Secretary of the Armyl Bendetsen and
MacFadyen Isic] that P & A [Army Personnel and Administration]
would work with the staff to try to solve the quota problem. The bottlenecks are General Brooks, Director of P & A, and his number two,
Colonel MacFadyen [sicl." Probative evidence of Army obstructionist
policies was found in a "statement sent out by P & A to all commanding generals forbidding them to use Negroes except in Negro units
and in ' Negro spaces' in overhead installations." Kenworthy concluded: "I know from the best authority within P & A that its hope
is that the Committee will submit its final recommendations-what
its recommendations are they don't much care-and disband.,, 55
"A SLOW AND PRACTICAL PRO CESS." An immoral and nefarious policy had become an albatross for the executive secretary. His enthusiasm and creativity in trying to circumvent, if not overcome, the
forces against change were beginning to wear thin. Kenworthy and
company were determined, however, to make sure that the long, hard
road traveled thus far would indeed lead to the destination they
had targeted. The import of their duties had been reinforced by a demonstratively committed and straightforward president. Because
each skirmish in the battle had been hard won, there was little else
to do but press ahead.
Neither the utilization and assignment problem with Army occupations and schools nor the general racial quota would slip away into
the quiet night. Gray wrote Fahy on November 17: "I have repeatedly declared that the Army is prepared to adopt a substitute for the
numerical quota if one could be devised which afforded assurance
against a disproportion between Negro and other personnel within
the Army in peace as weIl as in war time. After a most careful examination into the subject, 1 am compeIled to conclude that nothing has
been suggested by your committee which approaches this require-

ment.,,56

Kenworthy remained adamant on the continuing inadequacy of the
Army's schools policy: "The Committee very definitely stated to the
President in its inteiim report of II October that it opposes further
creation of Negro units and that its objective is 'the beginning of integration by a slow and practical process.' " Furthermore, Kenworthy
complained, "The officer detailed to write the .. . special regulation
has conceded that the regulation does not affect appreciably the
Army's present policy on assignment and does not reflect the Committee's recommendations to the Army." " Kenworthy argued that
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"the only way to make the opening of MOS and schools effective is to
infiltrate gradually the qualified, school-trained Negroes into white
units." The only remaining question was, "Does the Army intend to
do this by the revised 1241,,58
RAW POWER POLITICS . The intense wrangling continued until it
sometimes spilled over into raw power polities pitting military
against executive authority in particularly vexing, and sometimes excruciating, encounters. For example, Karl Bendetsen telephoned
Charles Fahy on November 27 to inquire whether the committee

would agree that the revision of 124 accurately reflected the policy statement
issued by Secretary Gray and approved by Secretary Johnson on September
30. Mr. Fahy replied .. . that he would by no means agree to such a procedure, and he added that if the Army issued a revision of 124 to commanders,
he would notify the White House of the Committee's disapproval; and furthermore he would issue a statement to the press making it clear the Com-

mittee had not approved the Army's policy. If this were done, Mr. Fahy said,
then a situation would arise which had so far been successfully avoided; i.e.,
a controversy in public.

After this exchange,
Mr. Bendetsen then asked whether Mr. Fahy meant that the Committee had
the authority to prevent the Secretary of Defense from approving the Army's

policy. Mr. Fahy replied that he was not trying to usurp the prerogatives of
either Secretary Gray or Secretary Johnson, and that they, of course, had the
right to issue an approved policy statement. The point he wished to make,
however, was that the Committee operated under an executive order of the
President, and that in the Committee's view the Army's policy did not meet
the re~uire ments of the policy expressed in the president's Executive Order
5
9981

As November 1949 drew to a close committee members were increasingly anxious to produce public results. They feared additional
encroachments on their power, not only through the now continuous
Army subterfuges but also by the second-guessing they were receiving from Truman's advisors and an increasingly impatient Congress.
It was a delicate, damnable, precariously frustrating enterprise. The
committee's presidentially mandated low profile was now proving a
liability rather than an asset. Many committee inembers pined for a
public relations counteroffensive.
The intricacies of the power relations are best revealed in the ongoing correspondence. Committee member Dwight R. G. Palmer wrote
Kenworthy:
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There is every evidence that Secretary Gray and all his people think along
the line of a Ifdisproportionatc" number of Negroes

VS .

whites . Well, this is

the quota business. We discuss elimination of quota and they pull this "disproportionate" angle. If you are going to continue to hold sessions with the
Army people land I think you should) keep us advised in report form and look
out you don't even halfway commit us to any subtle schemes of the Army.
To date I have not seen a revised 11 124" nor any further comments since Judge
Fahy referred to remarks by a Mr. Nash. Frankly, I am not sold on these
"second string opinions." Such fellows have no responsibility to us nor can
we sit by and le t the m lIopinionize " about how we ought to handJe OUf job.

We have members who believe some publicity must be forthcoming. Is such

a suggestion to die on the vine? We oUght to do something. 60

Palmer's misgivings did not preclude White House advisors from
issuing opinions on unresolved matters. The administration still
favored quiet diplomacy. On December 9, 1949, Nash advised Kenworthy that "a public statement should be avoided" and that if the
committee were still intent on making one, " then it should be as
mild as possible." The committee's dissatisfaction with the matter
of "assignment " in the proposed revisions to WD Circular 124, Nash
advised, should be addressed in a memorandum to the Army and copied to the White House, whereupon the White House "would indicate
to the Army that it should move to meet the recommendations of the
President's Committee,n61

Having publicly commissioned the Fahy Committee and having
defined its miSSion, the president, of course, ultimately was held accountable for the impasse. For example, Senator Ralph E. Flanders of
Vermont wrote Truman: "From various sources I get the impression
that your plan for doing away with racial segregation in the armed
services is not making very much headway, particularly in the
Army." Flanders issued what amounted to a threat: " The matter
should, I believe, be looked into by a Congressional investigation if
conditions are as I understand them to be and if they continue. It
would seem better if you could make another effort to have your desires followed so that a public investigation would be unnecessary."
The president issued a curt reply: "I read your letter of the 13th with
a great deal of interest . For your information, the program as outlined
in the matter to which you refer, is proceeding very satisfactorily.
Efforts are being made, of course, to cause us all the trouble possible in getting the plan to work. There are certain conditions which
have to be met on a gradual basis. Eventually we will accomplish the
purpose, if the busybodies will let us alone."" Other " busybodies"
entered the fray. Appearing on Meet the Press, Secretary Gray was
asked to explain why the Army, unlike its two sister services, had
failed to reach resolution with the Fahy Committee. In a somewhat
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self-serving defense, Gray denied he was making "trouble" for the
president and argued forcefully that he was actually trying to revivify
a process that had reached a "virtual standstill. ,,63
Denouement-1950
With the growing public perception that the president's committee
seemed stymied, Congress moved to resolve the matter on its own.
Truman and the defense establishment steeled for additional rhetorical pressure. On January 12, 1950, Representative Jacob Javits IRN .Y.) introduced a resolution to create a Congressional Select Committee investigation of discrimination and segregation in the armed
services. Javits complained that the services had been developing
separate policies: "Persistent charges have been made that practices
of segregation and discrimination continue in the Army. Nothing
could be more useful as propaganda material to the Communist
propagandists in the 'cold war.' '' In particular Javits maintained
that communist propagandists in· West Germany, Western Europe,
Asia, and Africa were having a field day over the dispute. And, he
noted pointedly, "With Communist China as a propaganda base, segregation and discrimination on grounds of race, creed or color in the
United States can be used to win tens of millions to the Communist
cause. 11M
On January 16, 1950, the Army finally acquiesced, announcing its
long-awaited revisions on WD Circular 124. The committee was
pleased with the final wording of section 10 and subsections lOa,
IOb.1 , and IOb.2, which addressed the contested issues of assignment
and utilization. Fahy informed the president of these latest developments and attached the Army's revision. Three of the committee's
four major recommendations had now been adopted. The final obstacle to full implementation was the Army's racial quota system."
Secretary of Defense Johnson felt the Fahy Committee, having
served its purpose, should now be abolished. Johnson asked TIuman
to turn the remaining issues over to the Defense Department, which
would be responsible for submitting "semi-annual progress reports."
Opposed to abolition, the president's advisors issued a spirited defense. Clark Clifford offered the president the following advice: "The
elimination of racial quotas upon enlistment is still under discussion
between the Committee and the Army. Even after a successful solution to that problem is agreed upon, Dave Niles and I think that the
Fahy Committee should be continued, possibly on an advisory rather
than an operating basis, for an indefinite period, so th.a t it will be in
a position to see that there is not a gap between policy and an ad164 / Steven R. Goldzwig

ministration of policy in the Defense Establishment." TI-uman, in a
marked demonstration of leadership, decided to continue the committee's mission until the quota issue was resolved. 66
On February 7, 1950, David Niles informed the president of
"friendly and encouraging talk on the Fahy Committee's remaining recommendation- the substitution of an achievement quota for
the present racial quota." Niles reported the latest committee proposal would now require all recruits to score a minimum of 90 on the
GCT test, make it difficult for low-score personnel to reenlist, and
eliminate the racial quota of "one Negro for every nine whites."
Niles deemed the proposal" fair," "sensible, " and"gradual" because
"Negro units ... would not be abolished overnight." Such rhetorical
characterizations were in keeping with Truman's stated goals. Thus,
this latest report must have been most welcome."
Truman, however, seems to have hedged his bet a bit regarding the
outcome of the final agreement between the Fahy Committee and the
Army. Secretary Gray seems to have requested and received approval
from the president and Secretary Johnson to return to the old system
if it became necessary. On March I, 1950, Gray wrote TI-uman: "If,
as a result of a fair trial of this new system, there ensues a disproportionate balance of racial strengths in the Army, it is my understanding that I have your authority to return to a system which will, in
effect, control enlistments by race.""
Nonetheless, on February 24, 1950, even before the final agreement
between the committee and the Army was reached, Kenworthy
would exuberantly inform Eric Severeid of CBS News that
What is going on is a kind of quiet social revolution about which the coun·

try knows nothing. We feel that over a period of time this opportunity for
whites and Negroes to live and work together is going to have an incalculable

effect upon the civil population. And it has all been done by concentrating
on the business of job opportunities, and also by not making a public hue and
cry, but sitting down with the services and persuading them that the y were
making inefficient use of the manpower they had. The Committee main-

tained that the services could not afford this human wastage."·

On March 13, 1950, Fahy informed Niles that a confidential agreement had been reached with the Army on March 6 to abolish the
racial quota and that the committee was now in the process of preparing its formal final report.7O
The final Fahy Committee report, Freedom to Serve, outlined the
monumental struggle to desegregate the armed forces and the Army
in particular. By defending and supporting the Fahy Committee,
Truman helped overturn Jim Crow in the federal government. The
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president's victory demonstrated a pronounced acumen: '''politics and
morality merged to produce justice. ,,71 Dalfiume summarizes:
'Ituman's issuance of the executive order and his i nsistence that its purpose
was to end segregation weakened resistance in the armed services. Furthermore, the President's backing for all of the Fahy group's recommendations to
the Army enabled the committee to overcome the almost total opposition to
integration in this service. Throughout this period it was the support of ci-

vilian leaders within the military establishment for integration that proved
decisive. The significance of the committee's achievements is that at its be-

ginning the Army had an official policy of segregation and at its conclusion
the Army was officially committed to integration."

The president was quite pleased with the Fahy Committee's accomplishments. Truman observed that equality of opportunity in the
armed forces would improve "military efficiency" and "strengthen .. .
our entire national life." This was a decisive step because it helped
establish the fledgling Truman Doctrine: "The free nations of the
world are counting on our strength to sustain them as they mobilize
their energies to resist Communist imperialism. ,,73 Thus opened the
widening gyre of civil rights and the cold war.

Sociopolitical and Cultural Legacy
Powerful political and social forces in effect at the end of the Second World War made it impossible to ignore or perpetuate the status
quo in U.S. race relations. Blacks were becoming an important political force at the ballot box and were growing increasingly unhappy
with the abrogation of their civil rights at home and abroad. Their
pleas for civil rights soon became entangled in the larger propaganda
chips of cold war diplomacy. This process was a creation of presidents, advisors, politiCians, and black leadership alike. For Truman
these developments had profound consequences. Even if his political
instincts told him to avoid African American rights, historical fortunes flung him into the vortex.
Truman, palpably aware that his presidential responsibilities called
him to a new and greater accountability, understood that constitutional protections had to be afforded to each and every American
regardless of race, creed, or color. Early on the president seemed ro
sense that the separate-but-equal doctrine was a method of ensh rining discrimination and, therefore, had become a "contradiction" that
had no place in contemporary American society. Truman's role in the
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federal government's extension of civil rights to its citizens was clarified in his efforts to introduce civil rights legislation and, failing the
substantive congressional hurdles at the time, was codified through
executive action ensuring equal opportunity in the armed services.
Civil rights legislation almost cost Truman the 1948 election. Executive action earned him an eminent place in civil rights history.
With the May 22, 1950, issuance of its final report, Freedom to
Serve, the Fahy Committee disbanded at the president's request. The
Korean War began in June of 1950. During that war, unlike those that
preceded it, the old bugaboo of inferior black units was displaced
as field commanders pushed toward, rather than away from, integration. As William Pemberton recounts, "By October 1953, 95 percent
of black soldiers served in integrated units." 74 The groundwork laid
by the Fahy Committee made this significant development possible.
For all practical purposes, "by the end of 1954, segregation and discrimination were virtually eliminated from the internal organization of the active military forces.,, 75 As Berman summarizes, Executive Order 9981 "was undoubtedly President Truman's greatest civil
rights achievement-and it illustrates the intelligent use of executive power to change, within admittedly narrow limits, a racist structure.,, 76 As Milton Konvitz notes, "in the history of civil rights in the
United States this order ranks among the most important steps taken
to end racial discrimination. li n
Just as important, the move to reorganize and unify the military
service to set up the postwar defense establishment, when writ large,
became a test of the United States's ability not only to rebound from
the war but also to assume its symbolic role as the undisputed leader
of the emerging new world order. Under the heady aegis of a dawning
Pax Americana, successive administrations assumed that if democratic principle ruled, then global democratic participation would follow. In hindsight, this political premise proved a recurrent, sometimes monstrously hazardous, rhetorical theme in much cold war
diplomacy. For in Truman's inauguration of the cold war, we find one
of the early rhetorical links to u .S. civil rights as central to the image
and consistency of American foreign policy. This argument was introduced by Tl"uman, used in his rationale for his appointment of the
Fahy Committee, and employed by successive administrations and
civil rights advocates ruike. Preserving human rights at home became
a linchpin for the attractive presentation of Western-style democracy
and rhetorical themes underlining, if not exacerbating, the emerging
global competition with the Soviets. Thus, the familiar dualist nature
of cold war foreign policy address, and the attendant bipolarities of
arguing good and evil systems of government, received some of their
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first rhetorical rehearsals in the struggle to integrate the armed services" Civil rights was a part of the cold war before Brown v. Board
of Education.
In the great tradition of American pragmatism, the president, the
Fahy Committee, and the Army would finally converge on rhetorical
values all parties held in high esteem: maximum efficiency as the key
to national security. The effective utilization of manpower reigned
uppermost in the arguments from all directions. Such normative criteria helped push principle into implementation and action. The integration of the armed forces, perhaps little understood for its enormity at the time, is now perceived as a monumental step that paved
the way for the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s.
On the other hand, the Achilles' heel of contemporary civil rights
discourse is perhaps also traced to the cold war. The cold war imperatives toward " maximum efficiency" and the preservation of " national security" no longer buttress today's civil rights arguments.
The contemporary assault on affirmative action programs, for example, may be a part of the post-<:old war, post-Soviet Union environment. Without an "enemy" to hate, we may be prone to lose our
grounding. When Americans are persuaded to moral action based on
xenophobic and nationalistic sensibilities, the moral moorings securing civil rights seem rather tenuous. Moreover, once the "enemy" is
vanquished or disappears, the individual may have a hard time supporting a positive personal ideology and endorsing any governmental
program of action. And the collective, having grown weary of the
discourse of individual civil rights, may retreat from any discussion
of human rights. Having known for so long what to be against, it may
be decidedly harder now for Americans to discern what one can and
must be for, individually and collectively. The recent court cases signaling a rollback on affirmative action may be harbingers that we as
a nation are ready to fold our social tent on civil rights and traverse a
long desert of the soul that may have little to do with the so-called
abuses in the present system. Of course, such speculation needs further development, refinement, and support. 7•
Arguments against desegregating the armed services bear similarities to contemporary arguments against haVing gays in the military, women in combat roles, and, of course, affirmative action and
the use of quota systems. What is perhaps startling is that many of
these arguments have changed little in over fifty years. The rhetorical
history documented here echoes the early roots of discussions on
affirmative action and the use (and abuse) of quota systems. It also
helps explain how affirmative action, as a concept, gradually but
perceptibly gained a foothold in the country's conscience and in its
institutions as a viable method of ensuring equality of opportunity
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for all Americans. Finally, I would like to address briefly a larger cultural legacy. With the fiftieth anniversary of the age of thermonuclear weaponry, inaugurated by the U.S. bombing of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, Harry Truman and his administration became the subjects
of renewed controversy, especially under the recent scrutiny of revisionists. But one might contrast those disputes with Truman's accomplishments as outlined in this chapter and reflect a bit further.
The nation also recently celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the
Truman presidency. Like most people, Harry S. 'Truman experienced
success and failure-and mostly with mixed results. On his efforts to
integrate the armed services, however, there was a particularly happy
alchemy. Both immediate and long-term good was achieved, and that
is a legacy anyone can applaud.
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